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Calendar No. 1317
88TIT CONGRESS ) SENATE REPORTd Session No. 1382
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
AUGUST 13, 1964.-Ordered to be printed
Mr. BAYH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the
following
R EPORT
together with
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. J. Res. 139]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the reso-lution (S.J. Res. 139), proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency andVice Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to dis-
charge' te powers and duties of his office, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon, with amendments, and recommendsthat the resolution, as amended, do pass.
AMENDMENTS
On page 1 line 7, following the word "States" strike the colon
and add the following:
within seven years from .the date of its submission by theCongress:
Strike all of Si.. 1, SEC. 2, SEc. 3, SEC. 4, SEC. 5, SEC. 6, and SEC. 7and insert in lieu thereof the following:
Article -
SECTION 1. In. case of the removal of tlhe President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shallbecome President.
SEc, 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of theVice President, the President shall nominate a Vice Presi-dent who shill take office upon confirmation by a majorit.'
vote'of both Houses of Congress.
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SEC. 3. If the President declares in writing that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the VicePresident as Acting President.SEC. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice
President with the written concurrence of a majority of theheads of the executive departments or such other body asCongress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to dischargethe powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shallimmediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President.
SEC. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congresshis written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice
President, with the written concurrence of a majority of theheads of the executive departments or such other body
as Congress may by law provide transmits within two days
to the Congress his written declaration that the Presidentis unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Thereupon Congress shall immediately decide the issue.
If the Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue todischarge the sane as .Acting *President; otherwise the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
PURPOSE OF THE AMENDMENTS
To substitute perfecting language that was acquired by the recep-
tion of testimony from expert witnesses in the field of constitutionallaw and from discussion of the problem by members of the subcom-
mittee.
PURPOSE
The purpose of the proposed Senate joint resolution' is to provide'for continuity in the office of the Chief Executive in the event that the
President becomes unable to exercise the powers and duties of the
Office, and further,' to provide for the filling of vacancies in the Office
of the Vice President whenever such vacancies occur.
"TATEMENT'
The ti'tt'nuiorW prosiont
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section l,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the executive
power at times of death, resignation inability, or removal of a Presi-dent. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the Office of the Vice President. Article II, section1, clause 5 reads us follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Offlc6, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress nma yb Law provide
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for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,both of the President and Vice President, declaring whatOfficer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by theConstitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge thepowers of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exer-
cise those powers and duties until another President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of theUnited States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disabilitybe removed, or. a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change the
substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear that
this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately submitted
was ta considerable alteration of the proposal which the Committeehad received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit, interpretation of the provisions as they relate to inability,
As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention contain only one
apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which deal with thequestion of disability, It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the ConstitutionalConvention of, 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.).
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Conventiondisclose.
It wa.snot until 1841 that this clauss of the Constitution was calledinto question by thin;ocfrrence of o e of the listed contingencies.In that year Pros&iWat William Henry Harrison died, and Vice Presi-dent John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this
provision of, the Constitution, he must serve, as Acting President or
whether he became the President of t),e Uiited States. Vice PresidentTylovrgav0 answer by taking the oath as President of the United States.While this evoked some protest at the time noticeably that of Senator
William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recognizedby both Houses of Congress as President of, the United States (Con-gressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, May 31-June 1, 1841).
Thiis precedent of John Tyler has- since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
the; United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,
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Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all have become Presidentin this manner.
T'1le acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress liave served to establish aprecedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1,
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of tile
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
ajpllies to succession in case of resignation, removal from office, orinability. In all four contingencies, tlle Constitution states: "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President."
'IThus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability. or removal from office of the President.(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919)).
The Tyler precedent, therefore, lias served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power andduties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice-President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery,
Whore both the President, and Vice President are incapable of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These consid(lrations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as Presi-dent, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed, tile prerogatives of tlhe Presidency. Thisinterpretation gilns support by implication from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5 of the Constitution which provides that:
'I'he Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro temnpore, in the absence of the Vice President
or when lie shall exercise the office of President of the United
States. [Italic Tuplplied.j
The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of tihe United States it has contributed materi-
ally to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President Garfiold lingered for some 80 days during which heperformed but one official. act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department at that time which required the attention of aChief ExecutiV(. Commissions were to )e issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Natioin required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as coul be disposed of by theheads of CGovernmlenlt departments, without Presidential supervisionl
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act, Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon tile ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
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Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler and Prof.
Tl'hodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the
advisability of the Vice President acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution
of Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedlyincluded the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
MacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it wouldbe desirable for the Vice President to act but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition prevented them from
presenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. Thisdamage to President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as th3 Shan-
tung Settlement were unresolved. The British Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by the President.
Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"
May 8, 1l/:'; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Cons
.'i:tional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's
wife and a group of White House associates acted as a screeningboard on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
impairment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "My Memoirs,"
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White house," pp.105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking theVice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
of the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting
such a possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know X
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery, the
President caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tumulty, "WoodrowWilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, in-
cidents involving the physical health of the President served to focus
attention on tile inability clause.President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in theConstitution relative to Presidential inability, and he attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of an informal agreement with VicePresident Nixon. The agreement provided:1. In the event of inability tile President would, if possible,
so inform tho Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had ended.
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2. In tile event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communiicating with the Vice President, the
Vice residentn, after such consultation as seems to him appro-
priate under tile circumstances, would decide upon the devolu-
tion of tlhe powers and duties of the office and would serve as
Acting Presidellt until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when theinability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.
President KIennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President Johnson as has President Johnson with Speaker John,
McCormiack. Such informal agreements cannot be considered an
adequate solution to the problem because: (A) lTheir operation woulddiffer according to the relationship between thle particular holders of
the offices; (B) a private agreement cannot give the Vice President
clear authority to discharge powers conferred on the President by
the Constitution, treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for
the situation in which a dispute exists over whether or not the Presi-
dent is disabled. Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers
as well as Attorney General Kennedy agree that the only definitive
method to settle the problem is by means of a constitutional
amendment.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE
The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the difficulties which it has already presentedd.
The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The
clause couples tlhe contingencies of a plerlanent nature such as death,
resignation, or removal romn office, with inability, a contingency
which may be temnllporary. It does not clearly commit the determi-
nation of inability to any individual or group, nor does it defineinability so that the existence of such a status may be open and
notorious. It leaves uncertain tlhe capacity in which the Vice Presi-dent acts during a period of inability of tlie President. It fails todefine tlhe period during which the Vice President serves. It does
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives
of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a President htas in fact recoveredfrom his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives wlile still disabled, might be prevented fromdoing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Execu-tive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times
when a President is disabled. Continuity of executive authority is
more important today than ever before. The concerln.which hlas been
manifested on previous occasions when a president was disabled, isincreased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of theincreased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the UnitedStates alnd to the world.
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified exami-
nation of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized becauseits procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience
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with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested pro-
vision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE
In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could con-
stitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep-
resentatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem,
Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under theConstitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Rep-
resentatives, February 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the presidential inabilityproblem.Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. Theypoint out that article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution author-17ed Congress to provide-by statute for the case where both the Presi-dent ad Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication,Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the
situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the VicePresident succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presi-dential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives theCongress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitutiondoes not vest any department or office with the power to determineinability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether and at who t time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to arguethat article I, section 8, clause 18 gives the Congress the authority to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinionin favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment is neces-
sary, and that a mere statute would not be adequate to solve theproblem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell William P. Rogers, and Deputy AttorneyGeneral Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
necessary. In addition to the American Bar Association and theAmerican Association of Law Schools, the following organizationshave agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona, Arkansas,. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
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Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,Texas, Virginia, Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New York
Passaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
Milwaukee, Wis. _==
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending tiie Constitutionis that so many legal questions have boon raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge atthle most critical time-that is, either when a President had becomedisabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the commencement and termination of disability.
Filling of vacancies in the Office of the President
Whilo the records of the Constitutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the franmers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, if any.
Trhe creation of the office of Vice President came in the closingdays of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
was considered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice and even a council of
advisers, as persons who would direct the executive branch should alapse of Executivo authority come to pass.On September 4, 1787, acommittee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of tile Constitution which had been postponed, recom-
men(ded that an office of Vice President be created and that lie be
elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties to
be porforrnel )by the occupant of the office. Although much de-liberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice Presi-
dent to the office of President in case of tleo death of the President.
A coummittmne, designflfe(d to revise the style of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become tlle
Constitution of tile United States. It contemplated two officialduties for tlhe Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity lhe would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing tlh votes of the presidential electors, and(2) to discharge tlie powers anld duties of the President in cnse of his(deatil, resignation, removal, or inability.
Whilo the (Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarlilng tlh Vice President as was the case for the President, theimnportlance of the office in view of tlh Convention is made apparently article Il, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provisionfor the election of thlo President and the Vice Presilent, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
equal in stature to the President.
The intent of the Convention however, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
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was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage, coupled with the
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appeasedisappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in ensu-ing years to mold the Vice Presidency mnto an office of inferiority anddisparagement.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Op-portunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE
The death of President Kennedy and the accession of President
Johnson has pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the
executive branch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Six-
teen times the United States of America has been without a Vice
President, totaling 37 years during our history.
As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its
wisdom foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice President's office should the President die. They did not,however, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional
amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and sup-
ported by many individuals. We must not gamble with the consti-
tutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the Ufited States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.The argument that Congress can designate a Vice President by lawis at best a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is meas-
ured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6 which states that-
the Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President andVice President, declaring what officer shall then act as Presi-dent and such officer shall act accordingly, until theDisability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall beVice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
S. Rept. 1882, 88-2--2
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and powers of the office of President shall devolve when there is:
neither President nor Vice President to act.
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidential
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of the.
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice Presidentthan there is to designating as President the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, for
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The answer to that question is "Yes," The Constitution has given
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as.
to who is to perform it in his absence. Article I, section 2, clause 4
provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5 provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers,including a "President pro Tompore, in the Absence of the Vice Presi-dent or wlenl he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." It is very difficult to arguo that a person designated VicePresident by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the pro-
cedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22 can be, the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the Office of Vice President
whon it becomes vacant is to permit the person next in line to becomefamiliar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serve on the National Security Council, head the
President's Commnittee on Equal Employment Opportunity, partici-
pate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. Those who consildor
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that, the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential suc-
cession law it enacts. Regardless of what office ho held at the time of
his designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same timo.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer itdesignates to act as Vice President, tho extent to which the President
takes himn into his confidence or shares with him tlhe deliborations- load-
ing to executive decisions is to be dletermnined largely by the President
rather tlhan by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for dete'rmilling who fills the Vice-Presidencywhen it becomes vacant bo established by constitutional amenl(hlenit
but that the President be given an active role in tho procedure what-
ever it be.
Finally, as in tlhe case of inllility, the most persuasive argumentin favor of amending the Constituti.on is the division of authority con-
corning. tihe authority of Congress to act on this subject. With thisdivision in existence it would seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolutelegitimacy was needed.
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ANALYSIS
Inability
The proposal now being submitted'is cast in the form of a con-
stitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution is unclear on twoimportant points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 139 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inabilityfrom those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby elimi-
nating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 embrace the procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of Presidential inability.Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that hasheretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.
By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes
clear that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the
office" that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the
status of the Vice President during the period when he is dischargingthe powers and duties of a disabled President.Section 4 is the first step of two, that embraces the most difficult
problem of inability--the factual determination of whether or notinability exists. Under this section, if a President does not declare
that an inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the Presi-dent is disabled shall, with the written approval of a maJority of theheads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of thepowers and duties of the Office as Acting President upon the transmis-
sion of such declaration to the Congress.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion andfthir possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can bo no absolute guLartntee against
usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most ofthe parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutionalpropriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude bo adopted thatpresumes we shall always be dealing with "reasonable men" at thehighest governmental loeel. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears tofurnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicialbranches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to thbPresident, both politically and physically, and presumably most
11
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familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would
henmade only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distinguished advocates for a specially constitutedgroup in the nature of a factfinding body to determine presidentialinability rather than the Cabinet.H however, such a group would face
many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannotdeclare his own inability the factual determination of inability would
be relatively simiiple. No need would exist for a special factfindingbody. Nor is a factfinding body necessary if the President can anddoes declare his own inability. If, however, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwilling to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this dis-pute should not be determined by a special commission composed ofpersons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be the effect,for example, if a commission of seven voted 4 to 3 that the Presi-dent was fit and able to perform his Office? What power could he
exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
the right to exercise the powers of his Office? If the vote were the
other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,
what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one votethe other way could cause his summary removal from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placedin this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the in-ternational position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the
amendment would authorize tile Congress to designate a differentbodyif this were d(eelmed desirable in light of subsequent experience._Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the President
to resume the powers and duties of the office upon his transmission
to the Conlgress of his written declaration that no inability existed.However, should the Vice President and at majority of the heads of
the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then they
could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties of
the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to theCongress within 2 days. Once thle declaration of the President stating
no inability exists and( the declaration of the Vice President and a
majority of tlie heods of tie executive departments stating thatinability exists, have boon transmitted to the Congress, then tlhe issueis squarely joined. At this point the proposal recommends that tleCongress shall make the final determination on the existence ofinability. If the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of bothHouses that tile President is unable, then the Vice President continuesas Acting President. However, should the Congress fail in any mannerto cast a vote of two-thirds or more in bothlIouses supporting theposition that the President was unable to perform the powers andduties of his office, then the President would resume the powers andduties of the office. The recommendation for a vote of two-thirds
is in conformity with the provision of article I, section 3, clause 6 ofthe Constitution relating to impeachment,
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This proposal ,clhieves the goal of an immediate original transferin Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
Vacancies
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will
always possess a Vice President. It would require a President to
nominate a person to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurredin that Office. The nominee would take office as Vice President once
he had been confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the
Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it was observed that the
office of the Vice President has become one of the most important
positions in our country. The days are long past when it was largelyhonorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
For more than a decade the Vice President has borne specific andimportant responsibilities in the executive branch of Government.
He has come to share and participate in the executive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy, there would be nobreak in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the recent uninter-
rupted assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is com-
patible with the President. The importance of this compatibilityis recognized in the modern practice of both major political partiesin according the presidential candidate a voice in choosing his running
mate subject to convention approval. This proposal would permit
the President to choose his Vice President subject to congressional
approval. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice Presi-dent of the same political party as the President, someone who would
presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the President.
CONCLUSION
This amendment seeks to remove a vexatious constitutional prob-loin from the realm of national concern. It concisely clarifies the
ambiguities of the present provision in the Constitution. In so doing,it recognizes the vast importance of the office involved, and the neces-
sity to maintain continuity of the Executive power of the United
States.
'The Subcommittee on Constitutional A.mendments approved this
proposal after hearing testimony and receiving written statementsfrom many distinguished students on the subject. The subcom-
mittee also had the benefit of considerable study reflected in congres-
sional documents previously published on this subject. In the light
of alt this material and evidence, the committee believes that a serious
constitutional gap exists with regard to Presidential inability and
vacancies in the office of the Vice President, and that the proposal
which is now presented is the best solution to the problem.
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RECOMMENDATION
The committee, after considering the several proposals now pendingbefore it relating to the matter of Presidential inability, reports favor.
ably on Senate Joint Resolution 139, with amendments and recom.
mends its submission to the legislatures of the several States of theUnited States so that it may become a part of the Constitution of theUnited States.
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HRUSKA
The problem of Presidential inability and succession has longbeen neglected and ignored. It is for this reason that I welcome the
opportunity to consider the joint resolution now presented to theSenate.
In the opinion of most legal scholars and writers who have giventhis problem careful study, the solution lies in a constitutional
amendment. Considering the gravity of this issue and the ramifica-
tions of the solution, it is imperative that in. any proposal advanced
the paramount consitutional principle in our governmental frame-
work is preserved. That is the doctrine of separation of powers.
One cannot predict the political crisis in which the Presidentialpowers may hang in balance. A review of the cases involving a dis-
abled President reveals the anxiety and confusion which can prevail.
It is also helpful to review the one case involving the impeachment
clause of the Constitution. The intrigue and interplay within the
Congress during the impeachment trial serves as a warning of clear
and present dangers when Congress is called upon to consider where
to place the mantle of the Presidential powers.
For these reasons our examination of proposed solutions should
carefully weigh the wisdom of adopting a method which does not
explicitly adhere to the principle of separation of powers. The exactprocedure prescribed, if clear and direct, is not my concern. Nor am
I wedded to any particular language. It is only the principle whichpervades the Constitution which I strongly feel should be respectedby any amendment.With regard to Senate Joint Resolution 139, my preference wouldbe to leave the matter of providing a method to subsequent legislation,
so long as it is limited to a determination within the executive branch,
and not lock in any specified plan in constitutional term. It istherefore of considerable concern to me that Senate Joint JORsolution
139 not only sets forth a particular method in an amendment butgoes further to provide a procedure whereby Congress can be thrustinto a controversy better left in the domain of the Executive.
ROMAN L. ITItUSKA.
INDIVIDUAL VIEXWS OF MR. KEATING
I heartily join in reporting favorably, with the amendments
approved by the committee, this proposed constitutional amendment
to the full Senlate.
It is a great forward step, in my judgment, towarrd the final adop-tion of a workable solution of these twin problems, the problems
of succession and inability which from the adoption of the Consti-tution have loomed as the most serious single threat to the stability
and continuity of the American Presidency as an institution.
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Yet much remains to be done. There is the task of shepherding
this measure, or some version of it, through both Houses of the Con.
gress by the required two-thirds vote in each; and then, for ratifica-tion by the States, through the required three-fourths of the Statelegislatures.
TJhe process of amending the Constitution poses an additionaldimension to the problem. It is iot enough that we devise a solu-
tion which on its merits appears to be workable. More is required.
The solution which we adopt here in the Senate must also be accept-
able elsewhere. It must be acceptable to at least two-thirds of our
colleagues in the House, many of whom have their own deeply held
convictions, as evidenced in various bills and resolutions, as to how
the problem should be handled. It must be acceptable also to as many
members of 50 State legislatures as will make possible its approvalin at least threi: fourths of them. At bottom, of course, this means
that the solution must be acceptable to the American people, who
through their understanding of what needs to be done and their
expression of confidence in what is being proposed, will ultimatelydecide the day in the Halls of Congress and in the State houses of
the Nation.
It is not enough, therefore, that Senate Joint Resolution 139, asit is reported to the Senate, is a good solution and one that I myself
can thoroughly and conscientiously support. What is involved, in
addition, is the extent to which it will muster the support of others
so that these efforts will not be in vain. This is a weighty practical
consideration. As many who have been concerned with these issues
over the years have said, it is ever so much more important to reach
an attainable solution than to strive for perfection at the considerable
risk of bogging down in disagreement as to precise detail.It is this reason, among others, which impels me to offer certain sub.
stitute language to this resolution which, if adopted, would in myjudgment considerably enhance the chances of ultimate success as well
as providing an equally workable and in some respects, superiorp1laln.These changes, which I shall describe and explain below, wouldleave unaffected in their entirety sections 1 and 2 of the proposed
constitutional amendment. Both of these sections, one confirming
the so-called Tyler precedent and extending it to cases of resignation
and impeachment as well as death, the other providing for filling a
vacancy in the Oflice of Vice President by Pre;idlutial nomination
with confirmation by majority vote of both Honses of Congress, have
my runqua lified and wholehearted endorsement.Sections 3, 4, and 5, on the other hand which would enshrine quitedetailed procedures on Presidential inability into the Constitution,give me serious pause. In my judgment, it would be preferable to
simply provide by constitutional amendment that Congress siall have
the authority to establish inability procedures by ordinary legisln-
tion. This would avoid freezing any particular method into theConstitution itself, make it easier to change the method if unfore-
seen defects are revealed by' the actual operation of any congression-
ally prescribed plan, and most important, so simplify the amendment
as to make it more readily understood and, hopefully, more likely offinal congressional approval and ratification in the States.
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I therefore intend to offer an amendment to Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 139, which would strike present sections 3, 4, and 5, and insertinstead the following new sections 3, 4, and 5:
SEO. 3. In case of the inability of the President to dis-
charge the powers and duties of the said office, the saidpowers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President as
Acting President until the inability be'removed.SEa. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of
removal death, resignation, or inability, both of the Presi-dent and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then be
President, or in the case of inability, act as President, and
such officer shall be or act as President accordingly, until aPresident shall be elected or, in the case of inability, until theinability shall be earlier removed.
SEr. 5. The Congress may prescribe by law the methodby which the commencement and termination of any in-
ability shall be determined.
These three sections which I am proposing to substitute are identicalto the last three sentences of Senate Joint Resolution 35, sponsoredby the late Senator Kefauver and myself. Senate Joint Resolution
,35 had earlier been approved by the Subcommittee on ConstitutionalAmendments and at this moment is still pending on the agenda ofthe parent Judiciary Committee.Section 3 as I propose to amend it would make it clear that it is
not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the office" of thePresident which devolve on the Vice President in cases of Presidential
inability. By establishing the title of Acting President, the proposal
would further clarify the status of the Vice President during theperiod when he is discharging the powers and duties of a disabledPresident. In addition, it would make clear that the President may
reassume the powers and duties of his office when his inability has
ended. In all these respects, section 3 as I offer it, would be identicalto section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 139, except that no specificprovision would be made for a Presidential declaration of his owninability which would tmnpo'rarily displace him from the exercise ofhis powers and duties. Rather, under this proposal, the method by
which the commencement of any period of inability is to be deter-
mined would be left for Congress to decide by ordinary legislation,
as explained below.
The section 4 that I propose would clarify the authority of Congressto legislate on thle subject of Presidential succession, both in cases of
removal, death andresignation, and also in cases of inability. It
would permit Congress to declare "what officer shall be President"
where both tie President and Vice President havo been eliminatedby removal, death, or resignation. Then, if neither the Presidentnor the Vice President is able to discharge the powers and duties
of the Presidency due to their inability, the Congress would also be
enabled to declare what officer shall--
act as President * * * until a President shall be elected,
or * * until the inability shall be removed.
Finally the section 5 that I will offer would authorize Congressto prescribe by law "the method by which the commencement and
termination of any inability shall be determined." This provision
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is at the heart of the amendments I propose, and represents my chiefpoint of difference with Senate Joint Resolution 139 as reported.Past efforts to frame a constitutional amendment on inability have
endeavored, like Senate Joint resolution 139, to set out in detail the
procedure to determine commencement and termination of a period ofPresidential inability. At one time, I myself favored the inability
commission approach, and even at this late date' there are quite a
number of bills and resolutions in Congress to set up a commission.
These proposals have varied greatly in detail as to the membership
of such a commission but most of them provide for either Cabinet,
congressional, judicial, or medical representation, or a combination
of one or more of these. Every such proposal, however, has becomebogged down in argument as to whether, for example, Cabinet
members who presumptively owe their primary loyalty to the Presi-dent would overcome reluctance to take action adverse to him; or
whether the service of legislators or judges on a commission would
violate the spirit of the separation of powers doctrine; or whetherdoctors can be expected to participate wisely in the formulation of
what is, at bottom, a political decision.
At long last, and after much debate, Senator Kefauver and I,
simply as two Senators who had long sought a practical solution to
tlis problem, agreed that if anything was going to be done, all of
the detailed procedures which had been productive of delay and con-
troversy had best be scrapped for the time beirg in favor of merely
authorizing Congress in a constitutional amendment to deal withparticular methods by ordinary legislation. This, we agreed. wouldletter allow Congress to pick and choose the best form among all
the proposals without suffering the handicap of having to rally a
two-third.l majority in each IHouse to do it. Selnate Joint Resolution3,1) was introduced to carry out the consensus we hOd reeled.
The Iltnllrutg, of Semlte tJointht Resolution 35 stemmed initially from
the New York Bar Association, and presently has the support of its
committee on constitutional law. Its basic provisions were also fav-
orably recommended by the American Bar Association's Committee9n-Jurisprudence and Law Reform in 1960, and in 1962 the American3Bar Association reaffirmed its endorsement of what is now Senate
Joint Resolution 35. At that time, the Association of the Bar of theCity of New York endorse it, too. As recently as Juno of 1963, tle
then president-elect nominee of tihe American 'Bar Association testi-
fied in behalf of the association before the Constitutional Amend-
mnents Subcommittee in support. of Senate Joint Rceolution 35.
.Finally,l til I)nlDputy At;torney General, speaking for the 'Department
of Justice, who tost.ificd( in 1963 andlwho has reaffirnled his earlier
testimony this year as still reflecting tie l)epartmlient's views, is infavor of' the approach of Senate Jointl Resolution 35. In short, at
one time or anotl)er, Senate Joint Resolution 35 has had lte approval
of all of the bar associations which had devoted years of careful study
and considerat ion to this problem. And while neither President Ken-
nedy nor presJdent Johnson chose to tale a personal stand on anyparticular proposal. it may be fairly snid that the JuTstice Depart-
ment's continued endorsement of Senate Joint Resolution 35 is closely
ttl!lllamoUnt to an administration position.
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As I tinderntand it, the principal objection to the approach taken bySenate Joint Resolution 35 has been that it would give Congress a
"blank check" in the area of presidential inability, and that Statelegislators especially would balk at a "blank check" constitutional
amendment. Apart from the fact that the Constitution in major
part is full of "blank check" provisions-the enumerated powers ofCongress under article I provide the most noteworthy example-
and that, moreover, the States have previously ratified "blank check"
amendments such as, for example, the income tax amendment, and theprohibition amendment which left all enforcement details to Con-
griess, the short answer is that Congress here would not be left free
to do whatever it wishes. Here is what the Deputy Attorney General,
speaking for the Justice Department, had to say on that point:
One objection may be that this provision is a blank check
which, if abused, could upset the balance of power betweenthe legislative and executive branches, and place the Presi-dent at the mercy of a hostile Congress. I think this dangeris quite remote, and at all events not great enough to out-
weigh the advantages of conferring this authority upon theCongress which represents the national electorate over more
complex constitutional provisions. If the methods adoptedby Congress for dealing with the problem do not meet the
standards of the separation of powers or otherwise satisfy
the President, he may veto the bill, and his veto could be
overridden only by two-thirds of each House. Moreover, ifCongress enacts a1 measure which is approved by the Presi-dent, and thereafter attempts to amend or repeal it, its action
will also b subject to approval or veto by tlhe President.
It seems unlikely, therefore, tliat any bill would ever be
enacted into law which wits not acceptable to the President,
and which did not afford adequate protection to the people
and to tle office of President (1964- hearings, p. 201).
It should be added to this, of course, that the President's approvalis not required for a proposed constitutional amendment to go to theStates for ratification. In my judgment, it is very important, both. as
a matter of substance and symbolically, tllt the Presidency as aninstitution place itsitmprimaturl upon whatever concrete procedures
on presidential inability are ultimately decided upon. Establishinginability procedures by ordinary statute, as would be authorized by
my propol sedsection 5, would permllit the President, in behalf of him-
self and tihe office lie occupies, to participate in the process of settinglip 1pr'per inabilit;;y procedures.I cannot too enthusiastically join in tile fine analysis of the Deputy
Attorney General as to tlie other overriding advantages of t;he flexible
al)proachI embodied in Senate Joint Resolution 38). The Deputy
Attorney General has stated:
'* * ?The wisdom of loading the Constitution down by
writing detailed procedural and substantive provisions into itlas been questioned by many scholars and statesmen. Theframers of the Constitution saw the wisdom of using broad
and expanding concepts and principles that could be adjustedto keep pace with current needs. The chances are that sup-
19
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
elemental legislation would be required in any event. In
addition, cruciall and urgent new situations may arise in the
changing future * * * where it may be of importance thatCongress, with the President's approval, should be able to
act promptly without being required to resort to still an-
other amendment to tlhe Constitution. Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 35 makes this possible.Since it is difficult to foresee all of the possible circum-
stances in whicl the Presidential inability problem could
arise, we are opposeel to any constitutional amendment which
attempts to solve all these questions by a series of complexprocedures. We think that the best solution to the basic
problems that remain would be a simple constitutional
anlendllent, such as Senate Joint Resolution 35, * * *. Such
an amlendnment would supply the flexibility which we thinkis indispensable and, at the same time, put to rest what legalproblems may exist under the present provisions of theConstitution as supplemented by practice and understanding.[En1iphasis supplied.] (1964 hearings, p. 203.)
And finally, I repeat that the simpler amendment, so capable ofbing readily understood by the people and by their representativesin the State legislatures, is in the tradition of constitutionnmaking.
The States hlo\re ratified a whole series of amendments giving Con-
gress the power to enforce them "by appropriate legislation," includ-ing the 13th amendlendt prohibiting slavery; the 14th amendment'sduo process equal protection and other civil rights clauses; the 15th
amendmenlt!s voting guarantees; the 16th amendment's broad grant
of income-taxing authority; the 18th or prohibition amendl ent; the19th or women's sullfrage amendment and the 23d or District of
Columbia vote amendment. There is absolutely no reason why Statelegislators should not wish to grant similar broad powers to Congresshere where, unlike as in manly previous amendments, no funda-
mental clash is involved between the respective powers of the
Federal and Sttite governlnents-and tlhe matter merely goes to the
mechanics, although very important mechanics to be sure, of coping
with potential emergencies 11 thle office of Chief Executive of the
FedlerlGIgovernment.
So tliat there miay be no basis for misunderstanding, I intend to
offer my prol)osed amendments not out of intransigent opposition toSenate .Jo.it IResollution 1.39 b1ut out of a firm belief that tlhe Senate
should bo afforded an opportunity to exercise its best; olitical judg-
mernt in choosing between two reasonable alternatives. Most if not
all of us are well enough acquainted with our respective State legis-latulres to forilln a rough guesstimatet" as to which alternative willfare better in the process of submitting an amendment to tlhe Statesfor rat ificat ion. And all of us, I am sure, have our firm notions as to
the nature of constitutionmaking and how best to frame at provision
which the American people may hu.ve to live with for a long time.
If the amendments I intend to offer are approved by a majority ofthe Senate, other members of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, we have agreed, will be prepared to endorse the new
sections and work for their approval in the States. On the otherhand, if my amendments are not approved here, I shall fully and
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unreservedly vote for Senate Joint Resolution 139 as it presently
stands and do all within my power to finally bring about its adoption
as a solution to this most important and fundamental problem ofAmerican Government.
KENNETH B. IKEATING.
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